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ABSTRACT:
Nepal is going through a period that is crucial to its future. After two years of a 
long and not always easy peace process, important reforms are beginning in an 
attempt to lay the basis of a new society, tackling some of the structural causes 
that led to the outbreak of the armed conflict. Nepali women have been deeply 
affected by this armed conflict, and, as with many other conflicts, its origin and 
course have had a notable gender dimension. Various factors provide evidence of 
this dimension, such as the use of gender violence or the large number of women 
combatants in the Maoist ranks, as well as the fact that the negotiation process 
which has led to the signing of the peace agreement largely excluded women. 
The purpose of this paper is to offer an analysis of the armed conflict and peace 
process Nepal is going through from a gender standpoint, analysing this situation 
from a feminist point of view. With this intention, the armed conflict that took 
place between 1996 and 2006 in Nepal is analysed from a gender perspective, 
paying particular attention to the consequences of the war and women’s active 
involvement in it. Secondly, the peace process that put an end to the armed con-
flict is analysed, concerning the negotiations and the involvement of civil society 
and the international community from a gender standpoint. Finally, some of the 
most important challenges to be faced so that the post-war rehabilitation process 
takes place in the most inclusive and least discriminatory way possible, giving 
room for broad transformations in order to put an end to the exclusion of Nepali 
women, are noted.  
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 51. Introduction1
Nepal is going through a time that is crucial to its future. After two years of a long and not always easy peace process, important reforms are 
beginning in an attempt to lay the basis of a new society to tackle some of the 
structural causes that led to the outbreak of the armed conflict. Nepal has 
the opportunity to create a new, inclusive society putting an end to the social 
and political discrimination that gave rise to the conflict. The armed conflict 
which pitched the Nepali government against the armed wing of the Maoist 
party CPN-M, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began in 1996 after the 
Maoists took up arms in order to overthrow the monarchical regime and 
establish a Maoist republic. The absence of democracy in a country affected 
by poverty, feudalism and inequality was at the bottom of this conflict which 
went on almost uninterruptedly over a decade. At the end of April 2006, 
King Gyanendra decreed the reopening of the Nepali parliament after several 
weeks of strong social protests which cost around twenty people their lives. 
Parliament had remained closed after the King suspended all its activities in 
February 2005 in his own coup d’état, through which he assumed all State 
powers. The protests that led to the overthrow of Gyanendra were organised 
by a coalition bringing together the seven main democratic opposition parties 
and the Maoist armed opposition group. The most immediate consequences 
of the end of monarchical power were that the Maoist group unilaterally 
declared a ceasefire, initially lasting three months, which was seconded days 
afterwards by the provisional government that was formed following the 
reopening of the parliament. An agreement was signed in November 2006 
putting an end to 10 years of an armed conflict, which left a legacy of 13,000 
dead and 200,000 displaced persons. 
Nepali women have been deeply affected by this armed conflict, and, as with 
many other conflicts, its origin and course had a notable gender dimension. 
Various factors have provided evidence of this dimension, such as the use of 
gender violence or the large number of women combatants in the Maoist ranks, 
as well as the fact that the negotiation process led to the signing of a peace 
agreement that largely excluded women. 
The purpose of this study is to offer an analysis of the armed conflict and 
peace process Nepal is going through from a gender perspective, analysing 
this situation from a feminist point of view. Removing the mask of apparent 
neutrality from armed conflicts and peace processes, concealing as it does logic 
of power and exclusion, means demonstrating that the reality of women is much 
more complex and diverse. Magallón includes some of the central elements 
making up the feminist standpoint,2 in research:
The questions raised and pursued by feminist research begin from a 
standpoint rooted in women’s experiences, always based on the complexity 
involved in recognising that there is no “experience of woman”, but rather 
women’s experiences […]. This implicitly assumes the lack of neutrality 
of problems and is equivalent to stating […] that behind every problem 
is a subject who considers it as such. […] a feminist point of view reacts 
critically to the fact that many of the questions and research that men 
have formulated and pursued concerning women have been intended 
to control, exploit and manipulate them. It consequently suggests that 
1 This paper is the result of research carried out in Nepal in March 2008 by the researcher from the Escola de Cultura de Pau 
María Villellas Ariño, in which she held several interviews with representatives of the Government, the political parties and 
Nepali civil society, as well as the international community. At the express wish of the interviewees, none of them has been quoted. 
2 The concept of the “feminist standpoint” has basically been developed by Donna Haraway, a feminist theorist who has 
argued the position that knowledge is situated and embodied; that is, it must necessarily be partial, locatable and critical 
(Haraway 2007: 328, 329), as opposed to scientific currents claiming that the origin of a problem is not important. 
She advocates situating the subject (researcher) on the same plane as the object (person being researched) in order to 
demonstrate the subject’s interference in the research (Magallón 1998: 50). Only by recognising and making clear that all 
views of reality are partial can a more objective view of it be achieved.
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the search for explanations and theories 
should serve women rather than meeting 
the demands of institutions or welfare 
departments. (Magallón 1998: 49, 50)
Meanwhile, adopting the gender perspective involves 
making it clear that the differences between men 
and women are a social construct resulting from the 
unequal power relationships that have historically 
been established. Gender as a category of analysis is 
intended to demonstrate the historical and situated 
nature of sexual differences. Analysing armed 
conflicts without taking the gender dimension into 
account means carrying out partial, incomplete 
analyses, leaving causes and consequences to 
one side, and taking the experience of only part 
of the population – men – and universalising 
it. The gender perspective seeks to expose this 
partiality. Therefore, analysing this process from 
a gender standpoint becomes very important, as 
this discrimination can be found at the root of the 
armed conflict in Nepal and has been present not 
only throughout the conflict but also in the shaping 
of the peace process that has put an end to it. It 
also makes it possible to highlight the importance 
of not leaving other discrimination, which has also 
been central in configuring the social and power 
structure in the country, outside the analysis. Many 
feminist theorists, particularly those from the area 
of post-colonial studies, have highlighted the need 
to analyse gender discrimination alongside other 
types of exclusion, such as those related to ethnic 
group or social class (Fraser 1995; Cockburn 
2007: 101), which, in the case of Nepal, become 
tremendously important. 
After this introduction, the text is structured in 
three parts. Firstly, the armed conflict that took 
place between 1996 and 2006 in Nepal is analysed 
for these purposes from a gender perspective, paying 
particular attention to the consequences of the war 
and women’s active involvement in it. Secondly, the 
peace process that put an end to the armed conflict 
is analysed, concerning the negotiations and the 
involvement of civil society and the international 
community, from a gender standpoint. Finally, some 
of the most important challenges to be faced so 
that the post-war rehabilitation process takes place 
in the most inclusive and least discriminatory way 
possible, giving room for broad transformations 
in order to put an end to the exclusion of Nepali 
women, are noted.
2. The gender dimension in the armed conflict in Nepal
The armed conflict that took place between 1996 and 2006 was deeply gendered, not only 
concerning its consequences, but also involving 
its origin, the ideologies underlying it and the 
discourse generated around it, both by the parties 
confronting one another and in the analyses carried 
out in politics and in academic research.
When it comes to analysing an armed conflict 
from a gender perspective, the clearest dimension 
for the application of this analysis and the one 
that usually generates least controversy concerns 
the consequences. The research and literature 
on armed conflict has been gradually – although 
still insufficiently – incorporating analysis of the 
different effects  contemporary armed conflicts 
have on men and women as a result of the gender 
relationships occurring in any society (Cockburn 
2007; Anderlini 2007; Giles and Hyndman 2004). 
Despite the fact that the majority of the research 
carried out on the armed conflict in Nepal has 
omitted the gender dimension, there are some 
studies which have included it, basically analysing 
the issue of women’s participation in the PLA 
and the impact the armed conflict has had on 
women. Analyses of other issues demonstrating the 
importance of this dimension in the development of 
the conflict have not been so plentiful, however. It 
must be highlighted that in Nepal, both the work of 
women’s organisations and feminist activism have 
taken place above all in the area of development, 
and only recently has there been a notable interest 
in incorporating the gender dimension into the 
analysis of the armed conflict. It must be pointed 
out that, after the end of the armed conflict, and 
associated with the claims made by different 
women’s groups calling for more space in the 
peace negotiations and in the political institutions 
charged with leading the transition, more research 
centres, NGOs and international organisations have 
redoubled their efforts to give this issue greater 
visibility. 
As Tamang (2002: 162) points out, the heterogeneity 
of Nepali society has also been shown in the gender 
structure. Nepal has been characterised by having 
multiple gender norms, something clearly connected 
with the ethnic and caste divisions in the country,
It is clear that not all women in Nepal have been 
sequestered in the realm of the domestic, nor 
has wage-labour, business and other realms of 
“the public” been uniformly imagined only as 
masculine; neither has the sexuality of women 
been consistently and narrowly regimented. 
Nepal: a gender view of the armed conflict and the peace process.
QUADERNS DE CONSTRUCCIÓ DE PAU Nº 4
 7
So any analysis made of what the gender dimension 
to this conflict has been must take into account the 
plural situation of Nepali women.3 A second factor 
that must be taken into account is the fact that 
87% of the female population of the country live in 
rural areas, with the proportion of women making 
up the rural population greater than that of men 
(Bhadra, Shrestha and Thapa 2007: 107). Given 
the eminently rural nature of the armed conflict in 
Nepal, this factor is vitally important in analysing 
the impact differentiated in gender terms. 
2.1. The consequences of the armed conflict from a 
gender perspective
As has already been pointed out, when analysing the consequences of the armed conflict it 
is advisable to adopt the gender perspective in 
order to offer a more complete picture of them, 
coming as close as possible reality. The studies 
that have been carried out in Nepal by different 
organisations, basically linked to the area of human 
rights, demonstrate how these consequences have 
been demonstrated in different ways. The first and 
clearest is that of sexual violence. Despite the fact 
that this issue has not yet received enough attention 
and still needs to be documented more extensively 
(IHRICON 2006), there is some data on it making 
it possible to state that sexual violence has been 
used as a weapon and war strategy by all parties 
involved in the armed conflict with important 
consequences for the lives and health of Nepali 
women. There are several sources that include this 
situation, most importantly the study published in 
2006 by IHRICON Sexual Violence in the “People’s 
War” or that carried out by Gautam, Baskota and 
Manchanda (2003) Where there are no men among 
others. The publicity international organisations 
like Amnesty International and the Geneva Centre 
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces have 
given to this situation should also be underlined.
All the studies coincide in noting that, despite the 
fact that cases of sexual violence perpetrated by 
all parties in the conflict have been documented, 
a large proportion of them have been committed 
by the State security forces, and, to a much lesser 
extent by the PLA, 
In Nepal, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence committed by security officials 
during operations, in custody and at check-
points were often been reported during the 
armed conflict. (…) On the other side of the 
3 Tamang notes some examples that would take account of this multiplicity 
of gender norms. For example, orthodox Hindu groups have placed a special 
emphasis on the sexual purity of women, while the Sherpa and Thakali com-
munities have taken pride in women’s capabilities in the business sphere in these 
communities. Meanwhile, the Burmese-Tibetan groups who live in the north of 
the country practise polyandry. 
conflict, it has also been reported that the 
Maoist rebels also used rape on a number of 
occasions. (IHRICON 2006:3)
Meanwhile, the studies carried out also coincide 
in noting a very frequent pattern concerning the 
exercise of violence by the State security forces 
that involved accusing the women who were victims 
of this sexual violence of being in some way linked 
to the Maoists, either as combatants, members of 
political structures or providing some other kind of 
support. It must be added that, although it is true, 
as has already been pointed out, that the Maoists 
also carried out sexual violence, the existence 
of strict codes of conduct in the armed group in 
order to prevent misbehaviour, including that of 
a sexual nature (Gautam et. al. 2003: 112), may 
have contributed to the lower incidence of this kind 
of violence. In addition, the fact that the presence 
of women in both the armed PLA group and the 
CPN-M political structures has been considerable, 
has probably had a direct impact on the use of 
sexual violence being less frequent.4
The consequences of the armed conflict that are 
relevant for gender analysis are not limited only to 
the issue of sexual violence, they are much broader in 
nature and refer to the effect the conflict has had on 
men and women and, as a result, on the relationships 
between them, particularly power relationships. 
However, these impacts of the armed conflict have 
not been so widely documented. Armed conflicts 
always generate important transformations in the 
social structure of the places where they happen. 
This has also occurred in the case of Nepal where, 
as well as these transformations, there have been 
outstanding changes in social norms and customs 
which are particularly relevant from a gender 
point of view. Taking into account the situation of 
exclusion and discrimination historically suffered by 
Nepali women, these changes are hugely important 
as they have called into question the gender norms 
that have traditionally governed relations between 
men and women in the country. 
Some examples of these social consequences and 
transformations would be the increase in the number 
of households headed by single women as a result 
of the enforced or voluntary displacement of men 
caused by the conflict, or the phenomenon known 
as “conflict wives” referring to women marrying 
soldiers deployed in a certain area and then 
abandoned to their fate when these soldiers were 
moved to another area of the country (IHRICON 
2006). This phenomenon was particularly important 
4 Almost 4,000 women were verified by the United Nations as Maoist combatants 
after the signing of the peace agreement. The issue of women’s participation in 
the CPN-M and its various armed and political structures is dealt with at greater 
length in the section “Women’s participation in the armed conflict” in this paper.
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in the places where there were military barracks and 
especially affected teenagers, generating situations 
where these women were financially abandoned and 
stigmatised. The prevalence of single mothers and 
women has notably increased (IHRICON 2006) 
in a society for which the family, and particularly 
marriage, is one of the basic pillars.
2.2. Women combatants
Despite the fact that the dominant view of women’s relations with armed conflict continues to refer 
to the category of victims, the analysis of these 
conflicts from a gender and feminist standpoint 
necessarily produces a much more complex picture 
in which women also play an active role.
The active participation of women in the armed 
Maoist opposition group and its political structures, 
including certain areas of the leadership, has 
received some attention, particularly from the 
media. Despite the growing incorporation of women 
into both regular and irregular armed organisations, 
their presence in this type of institution continues 
to generate both suspicion and surprise, as we 
are used to dealing with generalised explanations 
lacking clarification in the context of a collective 
imagination that links the female sex with innately 
pacifist attitudes, placing women combatants at 
the margin of social expectations or making them 
the exceptions who prove the rule.  
During the course of the armed conflict there 
was speculation that the proportion of women 
combatants was as high as 40 or 50% of the total 
(Sharma and Prasain 2004; Manchanda 2004). 
However, the final figures offered by UNMIN after 
the process of verifying the Maoist combatants, 
revealed a much lower proportion,  making it 
clear how this issue had been used by the armed 
group in order to legitimise itself. In a context 
like that in Nepal, it would be difficult to conceive 
that anyone having the idea of carrying out far-
reaching social transformation did not include 
among its central objectives the transformation 
of the position of women. According to the United 
Nations, of the 19,602 people making up the PLA, 
3,846 were women, that is, approximately 20% 
of the combatants. In any case, although this is 
a much smaller figure than the one put about by 
the armed group during the armed conflict, it is 
a significant figure, and the fact that the Maoist 
armed organisation should itself emphasise this 
participation by women is also significant. On 
many occasions, and taking into account the 
fact that armed organisations are tremendously 
masculinised contexts, women’s participation 
generates reticence, with the idea that the presence 
of women is basically a burden on the organisation’s 
effectiveness. However, in the case of the Maoists 
in Nepal it should be highlighted that the public 
discourse relating to the presence of women worked 
in the opposite way. 
Analysing the active participation of women in the 
armed conflict in Nepal from a gender perspective, 
leads to an ambivalent set of reflections, because, 
while the consequences of this participation are 
not entirely positive for women, they are not solely 
negative either. As Murguialday indicates in an 
analysis of the consequences of the Salvadorian 
armed conflict for women: “Wars do not only cause 
considerable suffering for women but neither are 
they a panacea for female liberation” (Murguialday 
2000: 39). Analysing armed conflicts from a gender 
perspective means approaching them based on 
complexity and avoiding excluding simplifications. 
In the case of Nepal, consequences of this 
participation can be observed in several senses. 
Firstly, it must be made clear that this prominent, 
active female presence has contributed to eroding 
the hackneyed stereotype of women as passive, 
defenceless victims of armed violence. This 
stereotype dominated the analysis of women’s 
relationships with armed conflicts until the 
emergence of feminist and gender approaches that 
have questioned its validity. So women used to 
appear as subjects, without capacity to react when 
faced with the consequences of armed violence 
and needing external protection, which was either 
provided by their closest surroundings (particularly 
the male members of the family) or the institutional 
context (the State, largely the security forces). The 
active participation of Nepali women in the armed 
conflict – most of them also dalit 5 or belonging 
to excluded ethnic groups – has provided evidence 
of the fallacy of this dominant view of women. 
For some authors, the presence of women in the 
Maoist ranks is a result of their desire to respond 
to the very harsh living conditions in the most 
remote areas of the country, where the economic 
and social conditions were practically feudal until 
the armed conflict broke out (Manchanda 2004). 
Other notable factors, for example, would be the 
fact that the Maoists led campaigns on some issues 
that were hugely important for Nepali women, 
such as the questions of domestic violence and 
alcoholism (Sharma and Prasain 2004: 152). The 
campaigns for a “dry law” promoted by the Maoists 
in the rural areas of Nepal in order to reduce the 
incidence of alcoholism among men in these areas 
are well known (Shah 2007; Bharadwaj et. al. 
2007), together with the establishment of parallel 
justice systems under which many men accused of 
5 According to Hindu beliefs, dalit people have no caste and are con-
sidered untouchable.
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abusing their wives were punished more quickly 
than they would have been by the ordinary Nepali 
courts (Bharadwaj et. al. 2007). So, at certain 
times, the Maoist insurgency served to improve 
women’s feelings of security in remote, rural areas, 
as, for the first time, they had the chance to access 
a justice system that led to a reduction in violence 
within families. Part of the active participation by 
women can therefore be explained by their desire to 
react to their situation of oppression and exclusion. 
Secondly, a consequence which is perhaps more 
indirect, but still important, can be derived from 
this presence. Women’s active participation within 
the different organisations making up the Maoist 
structure6 has served to promote the institutional 
presence of women, which was previously 
insignificant, and, above all, to put this issue on 
the country’s political agenda. Although it cannot 
be said that the approval of measures aimed at 
ensuring the greater presence of women in Nepali 
institutions was the result solely of the notable 
presence of women in the Maoist structure, it is true 
that this presence has served to promote certain 
policies and to meet the demands of many activist 
women and organisations calling on the parties to 
give women more space in Nepali politics. There 
are previous examples of this in other political 
conflicts, such as that in Northern Ireland. As 
Fearon indicates in an analysis of the role the 
Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition played in the 
peace negotiations in Northern Ireland, one of the 
main contributions this party (made up of women 
from the two communities) made was to promote 
the issue of women’s participation in politics and 
to encourage women from other political parties to 
raise their profile within their own parties (Fearon 
2002). In the case of Nepal, there was a similar 
process in which the strong presence of women 
in the Maoist ranks and the demands of women 
activists and women’s organisations came together. 
However, alongside these positive contributions, 
some elements should be noted that ought to temper 
the discourse put forward by certain sectors which 
had considered the incorporation of women into 
the armed struggle and politics at the hands of the 
Maoist insurgents acritically. Firstly, the criticisms 
made by women’s organisations from civil society 
should be highlighted. They have pointed out that, 
although it was true that the Maoist insurgency had 
served to speed up a transformation process that 
would otherwise have happened much more slowly, 
the credit for achieving the greater incorporation 
of women in certain public spheres or for having 
exclusively led a large number of social changes and 
6 Alongside the Maoist political party, the CPN-M, and its armed 
branch, the PLA, other connected organisations have emerged, such 
as the All Nepalese Women’s Association (Revolutionary), and the 
Young Communist League (YCL).
alterations in attitudes towards women cannot only 
be attributed to the Maoists. A widespread opinion 
on the consequences of the Maoist insurgency is 
that it has served to increase the level of awareness 
of the population – particularly the excluded 
population – of its own rights. As Bharadwaj points 
out: “One positive effect of the Maoist insurgency 
is that many of these marginalised groups now 
feel that they have a greater awareness of their 
rights along with the ability to stand up and 
demand equality” (Bharadwaj et. at the. 2007: 
36). However, many organisations point out that, 
without the work done by women’s groups in the 
past few decades, and particularly after the  World 
Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995, it would 
not have been possible to lay the foundations of 
these still incipient social transformations. So 
it would not be fair or accurate to attribute the 
promotion of a gender agenda only to the Maoists. 
In addition, it must be pointed out that, alongside 
the positive dimension of the presence of women 
in the Maoist structure, the gender discourse has 
been instrumentalised, with this presence often 
considered in utilitarian terms, not only in terms 
of transformation. For example, the Maoist leader 
Hisila Yami “Parvati” points out that, considering 
the role played by women in the domestic sphere, 
they were much more effective in mobilising 
masses, as they facilitated the Maoists’ access 
to other members of the family. In addition, 
Maoist women promoted the recruitment policy 
which established that each family must provide 
a member for the organisation (Yami 2006). It 
must also be made clear that inequalities between 
men and women persisted throughout the armed 
conflict within the organisation itself: “While men 
are continuing to develop in the military field even 
when they have reached beyond 40 years of age, 
women are hardly seen to continue in this field 
beyond 25 years” (Yami 2006: 27). The majority 
of Maoist combatants in rural areas were aged 
under 20, particularly girls aged between 14 and 
18. (Manchanda 2004: 250-251). Some authors 
have indicated that this recruitment – so selective 
by age – could have been a result of the Maoists’ 
intention to have a network of households available 
to provide supplies during the conflict, which would 
mean women of a certain age not being recruited 
so that they could maintain these households. This 
practice would reveal the persistence of sexist 
structures in the division of labour among the 
Maoists themselves, a statement reinforced by the 
fact that equality between men and women was 
never achieved in the Maoist leadership structures. 
However, it should be highlighted that the Maoist 
leaders placed an emphasis on the issue of gender 
inequality and women’s emancipation not being 
relegated to second place compared with issues as 
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central to the Maoist discourse and political agenda 
as the class struggle, although they did recognise 
that women’s liberation would only be possible 
after class liberation (Manchanda 2004:247).
3. The peace process in Nepal
The end of the armed conflict in Nepal happened as a result of a confluence of factors and was 
the product of a strategic alliance between the 
political and armed opposition in the country. On 
21st November 2006, the Maoist armed opposition 
group and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA,) signed 
a peace agreement that put an end to ten years of 
Maoist insurgency. The signing of this agreement 
was the result of a year of negotiations between 
the armed opposition and the then political 
opposition after King Gyanendra sacked the Prime 
Minister in 2005 and assumed executive powers, 
imposing an authoritarian regime on the country. 
In November that year, the alliance of political 
parties and Maoists signed an initial document 
of understanding, laying the basis for the peace 
process which materialised in November 2006 
in the form of a comprehensive peace agreement 
(CPA). The agreement included, as one of its 
principal points, the calling of elections to a 
Constituent Assembly.  
Peace processes represent unique opportunities 
for societies that have been affected by armed 
conflicts, not only to put an end to the violence 
but also as a starting point for more far-reaching 
transformation processes. Peace processes are, 
then, excellent scenarios for the transformation of 
the structural causes that have given rise to a war 
and for designing policies intended to tackle issues 
such as exclusion, poverty or democratisation. 
Despite the fact that these processes have a very 
far-reaching gender dimension, they tend to be 
represented as neutral, concealing the gender 
dynamics that take place during the course of them. 
A first important element for analysis from 
a gender standpoint would concern the 
presence and participation of women in 
the peace negotiations. This is an issue still 
open to discussion, as, despite the fact that 
the presence of women is no guarantee per 
se that the agenda for the negotiations will 
take gender inequalities into account, the 
truth is that, to date, it has almost always 
been women’s participation – particularly 
when they have a certain level of awareness 
of the issue – that has given led to processes 
which are sensitive to the gender dimension.
On this issue, it must be highlighted that Nepal was 
no exception with respect to the trend observed in 
all the processes that have led to the ending of 
different armed conflicts throughout the world 
in the recent past.7 The words of the special 
representative of the UN secretary general and 
head of UNMIN, Ian Martin, could not be more 
eloquent when he declared that: “At all the political 
negotiating tables I have seen in Nepal during the 
peace process, not once have I seen a woman at 
the table. So far in the peace process, decisions 
are being made by men for women […]” (Martin 
2007). So women were absent from the process 
and did not participate directly in the negotiation 
and signing of the agreements reached between 
the Maoists and the government. This happened 
despite the important role they had played during 
the popular revolt that took place in April 2006 
and which led to the end of the authoritarian 
monarchical regime, the restoration of parliament 
and, finally, the signing of the peace agreement, as 
well as their role in the course of the conflict and 
the consequences it had for them.  So, during the 
course of the negotiations, neither the SPA nor the 
Maoists included any women in their negotiating 
teams (Amnesty International 2007). 
It must be highlighted that the peace process in 
Nepal has been characterised by being a long, 
open process; that is, the signing of the peace 
agreement was not the culmination of the peace 
process. Instead it went on afterwards via other 
areas of political dialogue. However, all have been 
characterised by being exclusive areas. After the 
signing of the agreement, various institutions 
were set up in order to develop several of the 
key issues included in the peace agreement, 
including the National Monitoring Committee, 
on which only two of the 31 members were 
women, and the Interim Constitution Drafting 
Committee, initially made up of six men and 
subsequently expanded after a campaign led by 
women’s organisations to include six women as 
representatives of the dalit community. 
Although it is true that the agreement signed 
was the result of an exclusive, masculinised 
process, the actual text includes elements that 
are important for improving the position of 
women in the country and in the struggle against 
discrimination, not only in terms of sex but also 
for ethnic or caste reasons. So, among others 
7 A study made by the Escola de Cultura de Pau in 2007 highlighted the ab-
sence of women at almost all peace negotiations. The Peace Process Annual 
Report 2008 states that “in 33 negotiations carried out in the last few years, 
affecting armed groups present in 20 countries, of the 280 people taking part 
only 11 were women - just 4% of the total. The percentage is somewhat higher 
in government negotiation teams (7%), particularly because of the high per-
centage of women making up the Filipino government’s negotiation teams; 
in armed groups, the presence of women is almost non-existent (0.3%), and 
the situation is little better in facilitating teams (1.7%).” (Fisas 2008: 20)
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issues, we should highlight the fact that the CPA 
includes a specific point dedicated to the rights 
of women and children.8 Various points in the 
agreement, including the preamble, mention the 
need to tackle issues such as problems related to 
gender differences – as well as differences of caste, 
class, ethnic group and region – and to guarantee 
the principles of social justice and fairness. So, it 
must be recognised that, in the final draft of the 
CPA, there was capacity to incorporate important 
issues in order to construct peace from a gender 
standpoint. The fact that, as previously indicated, 
the issue of women’s emancipation formed part 
of the CPN-M’s ideas and practices was probably 
the factor that determined the inclusion of these 
points in the peace agreement.
As has already been pointed out, the peace process 
in Nepal was much broader than the negotiations 
between the political parties and the Maoists 
leading to the signing of the CPA. It is important 
to make clear that the process was not reduced to 
this space –in fact, it could be stated that it has 
not yet been closed– as many initiatives from civil 
society were developed alongside the negotiations 
in order to enrich and contribute to the peace 
process and its final result, and, among these, 
initiatives those led by women’s organisations 
should be highlighted. Many women’s organisations 
raised their voices demanding a greater presence 
as, despite the scarce presence of women in the 
negotiation process and in Nepali institutions, 
the women’s movement for peace and in defence 
of their rights was quite active and made some 
important contributions to this process. Many 
sectors point out that it was not a sufficiently 
inclusive peace process and that certain issues 
linked to improving the living conditions of the 
population were not as strongly present on the 
agenda as they should have been. It was, then, 
a process designed by the country’s elites in 
which dialogue with the different social sectors 
with the aim of incorporating their demands and 
needs and the desire to transfer its achievements 
to the population are issues remaining to be 
tackled. Many women’s organisations have tried 
to play this role in order to influence the process 
and also in order to act as a bridge between the 
political class and unorganised society. As Bell 
points out (2004), in peace negotiations, the fact 
that there are clear communication mechanisms 
between those taking part in the conversations 
and those who are outside, including women, is 
often more important than the direct presence 
of women in the negotiations. In Nepal, greater 
communication with the agents outside the 
8 Point 7.6. of the CPA states that “Both sides fully agree to protect the rights 
of the women and children in a special way, to immediately stop all types of 
violence against women and children, including child labour as well as sexual 
exploitation and abuse […]. 
process sensitive to this issue would probably 
have resulted in a stronger gender agenda. 
Concerning the capacity of women’s organisations 
to have an impact on the negotiating table, the 
creation of alliances between organisations which, 
before the peace process, had worked in areas 
as diverse as human rights, education, women’s 
rights, the rights of the dalit communities and 
women’s participation in the communications 
media should be highlighted. However, the desire 
to transfer women’s demands into the peace 
process led them to establish common platforms 
from which they attempted to affect the process. 
Among others, the Shanti Malika women’s 
network should be highlighted.9 This was set up 
in order to increase women’s participation in the 
peace negotiations, pressurising the government, 
the political parties and the Maoists. This is 
perhaps one of the initiatives that has been best 
publicised, largely abroad. Shanti Malika has 
demanded this greater participation using UN 
Security Council resolution 1325 as a tool to 
bring legitimacy to its demands.
Resolution 1325 has served these organisations 
to back demands for a greater presence of women 
in the political sphere, but also to establish 
wide-ranging gender agendas. The fact that it 
is an international instrument has also served 
to raise the profile of these demands, which had 
previously been widely ignored. The existence of 
resolution 1325 allowed women’s organisations 
to set their demands in an international context of 
requirements to incorporate the gender dimension 
into the political agenda. This has allowed the 
parties to gradually become more receptive to 
these issues, as the existence of an international 
instrument always strengthens local demands. 
In addition, the organisations making up this 
network have also promoted joint work with 
the political parties, not only to achieve the 
incorporation of women into formal politics but 
also to promote a gender agenda cutting across all 
political spheres. One of the long-term objectives 
would be to do away with the deep-rooted culture 
present in the political parties which has legitimised 
and continues to legitimise the exclusion of women 
and to transform the discourse concerning equality 
adopted by all parties into hard facts. 
As for the role of the international community in 
promoting the inclusion of women and the gender 
dimension in the peace process, it is appropriate 
to begin by pointing out that this is one of the 
commitments taken on by the countries making 
9 Some of the organisations making up the Shanti Malika network (Network of 
Women for Peace) are Nagrik Aawaj, IHRICON, Jajaran Nepal, ABC Nepal, 
FWLD, Didi Bahini, INSEC and Sancharika Samuha.
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up the United Nations following the approval in 
2000 by the UN Security Council of resolution 
1325 on women, peace and security, in which 
a call is made to all parties involved in peace 
processes to ensure such a presence. In the case 
of Nepal, the work for the inclusion of the gender 
standpoint in the peace process has been carried 
out by various international agents, both in the 
United Nations sphere (including UNFPA and 
the gender unit of UNMIN) and donors. The 
establishment of the Peace Support Working 
Group on UN Security Council Resolution 
1325 (PSWG), one of the four working groups 
set up in order to boost the peace process, 
should be highlighted. The main aim of this 
group, chaired and co-chaired by UNFPA and 
the Norwegian Embassy respectively, since it 
was set up has been to promote coordination 
and cooperation in the implementation of the 
recommendations included in resolution 1325, 
and it has operated as a coordination forum 
between the United Nations and the donor 
community since it began its work in July 2006. 
The PSWG has made an effort to identify the 
elements of resolution 1325 that are best 
adapted to the context of the peace process in 
Nepal, taking into account some of the priority 
areas of action for incorporating the gender 
standpoint into this process. So, some of the 
issues indicated as key ones would include 
participation by and representation of women 
(in formal politics), the establishment of an 
inclusive Constituent Assembly, the issue of 
the reintegration and cantonment of  military 
forces, transitional justice and reconciliation, 
and the responsibility and behaviour of the donor 
agencies and the United Nations. Although 
resolution 1325 is a sufficiently general 
document to serve as a guide in a wide variety 
of contexts, it is true that certain elements take 
on greater weight depending on each of these. 
Summarising, in the case of Nepal it could be said 
that, based on the framework offered by resolution 
1325, there are three main areas where there 
should be prominent advocacy efforts. Firstly, 
the participation of women in the area of formal 
politics and institutions, as their exclusion from 
these has been flagrant. Secondly, the issue of 
the reform of the security sector, given the large 
number of women who have taken an active part 
in the conflict as combatants and, on the other 
hand, the overwhelming masculinisation of this 
sector. Finally, it would be necessary to begin a 
reconciliation progress that would include the 
experience of women and the impact of the armed 
conflict on them, and which would approach 
reconciliation proposals from this perspective. 
4. Looking to the future: challenges 
for a post-war rehabilitation process 
from a gender perspective.
Nepal is going through a transition process after the end of the armed conflict in which 
the implementation of the peace agreement has 
begun with the establishment of new institutions 
and large-scale legislative reforms, particularly the 
drafting of a new Constitution. It is a situation that 
could be particularly fertile for the development 
of reforms which could put an end to the gender 
inequality present in many areas of the political, 
social, cultural and economic life of the country. 
It is time, then, to properly identify the principal 
challenges and the demands made by women’s 
organisations for carrying out these reforms. 
It must be pointed out that, in the next few years, the 
political situation in the country will be marked by 
the work of the Constituent Assembly, which needs 
to be capable of laying the basis for refounding the 
country on principles of democracy, fairness and 
justice. So, one of the first challenges would be to 
configure more inclusive, democratic institutions 
that better represent the plurality of the country, 
not only in terms of the sex-gender axis, but also 
putting  the ethnic plurality of the country and the 
existence of many excluded population groups at the 
centre of the design of public policy. However, it is 
important to point out that the democratisation of 
political institutions does not necessarily bring with 
it the democratisation of a society in a broader sense 
(Waylen in Roulston 2004), if these institutions are 
not capable of carrying out genuinely transforming 
policies and if changes are relegated to the formal, 
institutional sphere. In addition, it is appropriate 
to note that not only must under-representation in 
the political arena be tackled, it is also important 
to make clear that the exclusion of women from 
the public realm also corresponds to social and 
cultural issues. This means activities carried out 
by women are not perceived as political and are 
therefore thought to be irrelevant to the post-war 
rehabilitation processes (Chinkin 2004). Because 
of this, although any contributions that might 
be made to and from the Constituent Assembly 
are extremely important, largely unrealistic 
expectations must not be generated concerning this 
institution’s real capacity for transformation. 
Meanwhile, and in order to guarantee that 
women’s participation in politics is effective, a 
process of empowerment and training of future 
women parliamentarians would be necessary in 
order for their presence in these institutions to 
be a substantial one. It must be pointed out that 
one of the complaints formulated by many women 
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who have taken part in elections as candidates is 
that they are not supported by their own political 
groups and that their participation as candidates 
has been more of a response to legal requirements 
than the result of a true political will to establish 
significant gender agendas. So, although it is true 
that the quota policy might mean an initial boost 
to promote the presence of women in deeply hostile 
contexts, it is also a fact that such a presence 
can be stripped of all content if the parties do not 
recognise the importance of women taking an active 
part in politics. However, it must be pointed out 
that the results of the elections to the Constituent 
Assembly have been relatively favourable to this 
presence of women, and 33.22 per cent of seats will 
be occupied by women, a figure slightly higher than 
that established by the Interim Constitution, which 
indicated that women’s representation must be 33 
per cent. So, although they are fewer in numerical 
terms, their presence will be an appreciable one. 
One of the main challenges noted by the various 
women’s organisations that have been involved in 
the peace process in the country is the repeal of 
discriminatory legislation. Amnesty International 
points out that in 2007 there were still 118 
applicable discriminatory provisions in 54 different 
laws. Discriminatory legislation is one of the main 
obstacles perpetuating the denial of full citizenship 
to Nepali women and, because of this, its reform or 
repeal should be one of the first measures adopted 
by the Government. The laws that have excluded 
women have served to legitimise political, social 
and cultural practices, attitudes and behaviours 
that have impeded the full development of women’s 
capabilities. In addition, they have served to 
normalise issues such as violence against women, 
their lack of access to private property and failings 
in terms of personal autonomy, perpetuating the 
dependence and infantilisation of Nepali women by 
denying them the exercise of full citizenship. So, 
putting an end to discriminatory legislation and 
beginning new legislative development that would 
safeguard and promote the exercise of women’s 
human rights is an urgent requirement. 
Another area to which more attention must be paid 
so as not to generate new exclusions in the post-war 
rehabilitation process concerns the reform of the 
security sector. Although the reforms and policies 
to be implemented have not yet been defined, so it 
is still early to indicate the action that should be 
taken to ensure the gender dimension is taken into 
account, it is also true that the current moment 
is a very good one for women’s organisations and 
all the bodies involved to put forward proposals, 
as the decisions have not yet been made and are 
therefore still being defined. As has already been 
pointed out, the figure for women combatants is a 
significant one and, because of this, regardless of 
the decisions finally adopted – integration of the two 
armies, integration of the Maoist combatants into 
other State security forces or bodies, reintegration 
into civil life – it is important that women’s specific 
needs are taken into account. In many security 
sector reform processes in post-war contexts, 
women have been excluded from the benefits 
granted to male combatants and their access to 
resources, like training, employment or financial 
compensation, limited. Meanwhile, the risk of 
stigmatisation for the women who have taken up 
arms during the armed conflict must be highlighted. 
There are many social prejudices against these 
women whose crossing of the dividing line between 
the public and the private and the assignment of 
tasks involved in this sexist division goes beyond 
the limits of what is socially acceptable. This risk of 
stigmatisation means there could be self-exclusion 
from the benefits that could be obtained in the 
security sector reform processes, as has happened 
in many similar processes in other countries, so 
this is a group to which particular attention must 
be paid to ensure equality and non-exclusion.
A priori, two basic issues should be taken into 
account. Firstly, ensuring that women combatants 
have equal access to all opportunities or benefits 
that might be offered to promote either integration 
into the armed forces or other security bodies 
or their reintegration into civilian life. So, the 
requirements established must not be exclusive, 
discriminatory or insensitive to gender inequality. 
Secondly, the reform of this sector must be designed 
taking into account the special needs of women 
–not only combatants but also civilians. 
When talking about security, violence against 
women is a very important element. More than a 
third of Nepali women have experienced domestic 
violence (Sharma Paudel 2007), which is also a 
high percentage of all the violence experienced 
by women in the country (Dhakal 2008). In fact, 
this is one of the first elements noted by women’s 
organisations when they mention the main 
challenges the country must tackle in the post-war 
rehabilitation process.10 This issue must therefore 
be tackled urgently, as these high rates of violence 
have tremendous consequences for the lives and 
health of women and are a serious obstacle to 
exercise of the rights of citizenship, as well as 
perpetuating the submission and confinement of a 
large number of women in the private sphere. 
As is included in this paper, there are many challenges 
for achieving real transition in Nepal, not just in 
military and political terms but, fundamentally, in 
10 All the women interviewed in drawing up this study mentioned violence 
against women as one of the most pressing challenges in the country. 
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social terms. The exclusion of women in the country 
has been symptomatic of an elitist political system 
in which the roots that gave rise to the armed 
conflict which has afflicted the country over the past 
decade can be found. Achieving the full exercise of 
the rights of citizenship for women in the country 
will be an unquestionable indicator of far-reaching 
transformations meaning that the risk of the armed 
conflict breaking out again have been considerably 
reduced, as well as showing that some of the 
structural causes leading to it have been tackled. 
Carrying out a post-war rehabilitation process 
from a gender perspective does not mean isolated, 
formal reforms based on political correctness but a 
radical questioning of forms of social organisation 
that perpetuate exclusion and give rise to armed 
conflicts. It ultimately means giving the word 
democracy its full meaning and rethinking the 
organisation of social, economic and political 
life from the standpoint of inclusion and justice. 
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